determination, andliberation from suffering, values that we prize so highly in our culture. Why should those who know how to administer death rapidly and painlessly not be given legal authorization to do so for those suffering persons who want to die, but' who cannot, either because of lack of knowledge or physical inability, administer death effectively to themselves? The position that favors legalization of voluntary euthanasia claims that there are no convincing reasons to withhold such legal authorization.
Illusion 1
I believe this position rests on naive and illusory. ,assumptions. It is highly questionable that we would be able to uphold the voluntary character of euthanasia were it to become a legally and socially acceptable option. Voluntary means freedom from coercion, pressure, undue inducement, and psychological and emotional manipulation. There is no law permitting voluntary euthanasia that could, even if implemented via complex procedures, protect vulnerable people against subtle manipulation to request socially acceptable administered death when they would rather live and be cherished. Theposition in favor of legalizing voluntary euthanasia begs /or a world .ofideal hospitals, doctors, nurses and families. But we do not live in an ideal world.
Illusion 2
This position is really doubly naive. It assumes thac after legalization of voluntary euthanasia we would be enduringly willing and able to withstand the extension of administered death to those 'who are irreversibly unable to request or consent to the termination of their lives. There are many persons in our hospitals, chronic care wards, and nursing homes across the land whose • EDITORIAL I maintain, repeat, and attempt to strengthen my stand -indeed, my uncompromising stand -against granting doctors, or any other persons, legal immunity to practice euthanasia, sometimes called active euthanasia, and understood here to mean the deliberate, compassionmotivated, rapid and painless termination of a suffering person's life.
Some have proposed that only voluntary euthanasia should be legalized or decriminalized. This position sounds good and reasonable. Only those who so desire would have death administered to them. The position appeals to the values of autonomy, independence, freedom, self-T he accompanying guest editorial, .About an "Unconfirmed" Stand, in this issue of the Journal challenges me to reconcile my written with my spoken words on euthanasia. The reference to written words is specifically to my editorial, titled Euthanasia -Taking a Stand, in the last number of the Journal (1). The spoken words refer to a particular lecture in which I said, as I have said publicly many times, that hastening a patient's death could, in some circumstances; be ethically justifiable, or at least ethically tolerable. But I have also written about ethically justifiable exceptions to general rules. Nine years ago, I cited the thesis of the film Breaker Morant: in war, situations occur that fall outside all existing rules. I continued: "Similar situations arise in medicine. I suppose the ultimate challenge of ethics consists in knowing what to do when all the existing rules fail to apply" (2) . I am challenged now to explain how my statement about the ethical tolerability of euthanasia in some circumstances can be consistent with my . uncompromising stand against the legalization of euthanasia. I accept the challenge.
lives, by standards external to themselves and in the perceptions of others, are hardly worth living. All that many of these persons, have left is the ability to sense and experience biological pain and comfort, gentleness of care, pleasing sound, human presence and warmth. Some cannot experience even that, but their relatively strong bodies cling to life. I foresee that the social barriers against involuntary euthanasia would crumble, maybe rapidly, maybe slowly, but they would crumble. There would then be little to stand in the way of changing the law, already 'changed to permit voluntary euthanasia, to now permit administration of death to those who no longer have a will of their own in the matter.
Illusion 3
There is a third illusion. Some want some sort of legislation passed that would protect wellmeaning doctors against prosecution when they administer euthanasia to suffering persons who truly request this on their own initiative. If there are ethically' justifiable exceptions to a lawã gainst voluntary euthanasia, doctors should not so the argument runs, have to administer eutha-' nasia in fear and trembling of being brought to trial and perhaps, to the ruin of their reputations and careers.
The illusion is in the thought that a law can be devĩed, so clear in its conditions iind implementation procedures, that professionals and familial survivors will generally conclude that the doctor honored the patient's true desires and abided by all the conditions and procedures of the law. But that honoring and abiding are matters of fact. These are the kinds of matter that are brought before courts of law, particularly by well-meaning, or even ill-meaning; survivors who suspect physician negligence, or by families, torn by dissension over the fact that death was ' administered to their relative.
. It is utterly naive to imagine that a law permitting voluntary euthanasia would reduce the likelihood Or frequency of doctors, appearing before the courtS to defend their administrations of euthanasia. The more frequent these acts of euthanasia would become -and frequent they would become with such a law -the more likely it is that this law would be used as a legal arena for the pursuit of doctors by those who do not morally accept the law; or by those who doubt the law was properly applied in a particular case; or by some grieving family members who believe other family members were all too eager in supporting a loved one's request for release from suffering.
Illusion 4
There is a last illusion I would expose and it is the most dangerous of all. It docks in the bay of well-meaning simplicity, the simplicity that imagines we would remain the caring society we think ourselves to be after we would accept and implement a law permitting voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. The simplicity consists in the narrow focus on the particular siruation in which one person, here a physician authorized by a law supporting voluntary euthanasia, wants to do good for another person, a patient' requesting release from unbearable suffering.
That narrow .focus ignores or simply does not see what Loren Graham, in the context of his discussion of eugenics and genetics in Russia and Germany during the 1920s, has called the "second-order" links between science and values. Second-order links are difficult to see. They depend upon existing -and changing -political and social situations, and upon the persuasiveness of current -and emerging -philosophies and ideologies, however flawed these may be (3). The uses to which genetics may be harnessed, or the programs which a law permitting euthanasia could come to serve, depend upon these second-order links over which we rarely have comprehensive control when we develop a science or change a law.
In 1920, Karl Binding, a doctor of jurisprudence and philosophy,' and Alfred Heche, a doctor of medicirie, published a book in Germany on euthanasia (4). They did not intend the Nazi 'euthanasia programs that were a central focus at the Nuremberg trials. Nor, perhaps, could these two eminent men have foreseen the "second-order" links between their "benevolent" ideas on e~thanasia and an emerging Nazi ideo-lo~y.
But those links were eventually forged, and evidence at the Nuremberg trials established the influence this book exerted on those who designed and implemented the Nazi programs.
The signs in our society of overt discrimination, of latent racism, and of utilitarian insensitivity to the vulnerable are tOO prominent for me to be insouciant about proposals to decriminalize euthanasia. I shall persist in my uncompromising stand against a law that would permit the administration of death. Yet there is no law, riot even the law interdicting euthanasia, that can match the infinite variety of human situations. That is, in part, the reason for the difference between statutqry law and jurisprudence, between law and ethics.
BACK TO BREAKER MORANT
In medicine, as in war, situations occur that fall outside all existing rules. What should one do when a husband and adult sons ask, in front of their mother dying from throat cancer, and with her nodding agreement, that the doctor put her "to sleep" Saturday or Sunday, the days when everyone expected her to die. Her pain was bearable, but the periodic choking episodes were terrifying to this woman. She wanted to die in peace and tranquility. She did not want her last moments of consciousness to be the consciousness of panic and terror. The doctor believed that euthanasia was the only route open to him to give this woman and her family what they so deeply and reasonably desired. But the doctor could not walk that route. The woman did die on the Sunday and in a choking episode.
After the funeral, the husband and sons were crushed by guilt, and so were the staff who had cared for this woman. "What would you have done?" I was asked. I responded that I thought everything necessary should have been done to assure that this woman died, not in choking pain, but in tranquility. It was wrong to let her die in terror.
This woman was dying. Her death was inevitable and imminent. Her life was already out of the doctor's hands, and anyone else's hands for that matter. Only the timing of her death was still in the doctor's control and he, upon the woman's silent request and upon the explicit request of her family, would have been utterly justified ethically in timing that death for a moment of tranquility. This is only one story illustrating an ethically justifiable advancing of a death that is both inevitable and imminent. We need not change our laws to guarantee doctors immunity from prosecution in such circumstances. We need rather to perfect communication between patients, families, doctors and clinical staff so that, when such circumstances arise, all together will know and come to agree on the right thing to do. It is not inconsistent to judge certain acts of hastening death to be morally justifiable and yet simultaneously to hold that laws should not be modified to grant to doctors or anyone else legal authorization in advance to carry them out.
Some will raise the objection: but doctors will be uncertain and concerned that someone could still accuse them of murder. They will then administer ethically justifiable euthanasia, if they do at all, only in fear and trembling of the possible legal consequences they may have to endure. Chaim Perelman, eminent professor of law at the University of Brussels, has considered ,this very situation. He draws attention to the fictions that juries and judges use in exceptional circumstances to avoid applying the law against persons who have committed acts against the law, but acts that are seen as ethically understandable and justifiable in the particular circumstances. The fiction in question consists in a jury "qualifying facts in a way contrary to reality, by declaring that the accused has not committed murder, and it does this to avoid applying the law" (5) . In Perelman's view, this recourse to fiction-t'is better than providing expressly, in law, for the fact that euthanasia is a case for justification or excuse" (6).
Perelman believes, and I too believe, that we would risk grave abuse in promulgating indulgent legislation in this matter of life or death (7) . We should all rally to protect those who, in rare circumstances, know how to exercise charismatic authority, the authority that consists in knowing what to do when all established ethical and legal rules fail to apply. We should not, however, give facile credence to those who would want to generalize that exercise of charismatic authority. It is sane, not inhumane, to surround those \vhp would administer beneficent death with spotlights of vigilance. Fear and trembling in this matter is not a bad thing. at all.
